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Abstract
What factors explain the persistence and pervasiveness of corruption in
certain parts of the world? In West Africa, many day-to-day transactions
require the payment of bribes. Quantitative evidence on these bribes and their
determinants is scarce. This paper sheds light on the level and the frequency of
bribe payments in informal cross-border trade. It examines how bribes depend
on the trade regime and on market structure. We rely on data from a survey of
traders in Benin to estimate the determinants of bribe payments. We exploit
variations in the trade regime across Benin's borders, as well as changes in
trade restrictions over time and variations in route availability across space
and time. We ﬁnd that reductions in trade barriers help to lower bribes, but
do not eliminate them, with bribes remaining frequent in liberalized trade
regimes. These results suggest that collusive corruption - used to circumvent
regulations and taxes - coexists with coercive corruption, where oﬃcials use
their monopoly power to extract transfers from traders.
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1 Introduction
Why is corruption so pervasive and persistent in certain parts of the world, such
as Sub-Saharan Africa, for example? Despite three campaigns against corruption
organized by the World Bank in 22 years, a convention on preventing and combating
corruption adopted by the African Union, and numerous reports from the World
Bank and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), African
countries remain highly corrupt according to existing rankings (OECD/WorldBank,
2012; UNECA, 2016; World Bank, 2017).1
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) classify two types of corruption: "with theft" and
"without". In cases with theft, bribe payers collude with oﬃcials to reduce the
payment of a tax or to avoid a regulation. Rents created by the transaction are
shared between the private agent and the public oﬃcial. Bribery without theft
requires the bribe payer to pay the oﬃcial an additional amount in excess of the
oﬃcial price in order to access a particular public service. This type of bribe is said
to be coercive. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) suggest that "corruption with theft aligns
the interests of the buyers and sellers" and consequently "it will be more persistent
than corruption without theft, which pits buyers against sellers."
In this paper, we use rich data from a survey on informal cross-border trade
(ICBT) in West Africa to study the frequency and level of bribes paid by traders
during their journey to the border. We ﬁrst examine whether bribes are widespread.
We then study the determinants of the bribes to understand which factors depress
or increase the price of bribes. We exploit cross-sectional variations in trade regimes
and products, as well as changes in trade barriers over time, to identify their impact
on bribes. We also exploit precise information on transport modes, on the location
of traders' starting and arrival points and of border crossing points, and on the
alternative routes a trader may use.
Because of the dearth of data regarding bribery, only a handful of empirical
papers have tried to break down the mechanisms at play when bribes are paid.
Most existing studies have examined the trade and transport sectors, where bribery
is particularly pervasive (Lavallée and Roubaud, 2018). Sequeira (2016) uses data
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from an audit study of large shipments imported by formal ﬁrms into South Africa,
with direct data on bribe payments at the border. She ﬁnds that bribes paid to
customs agents decreased when tariﬀs were reduced, with some evidence of a shift
from collusive to coercive bribery. Sequeira and Djankov (2014) link a dataset of
bribes paid at ports in South Africa and Mozambique to data on formal importers.
They ﬁnd that importers adapt their transport strategy in function of corruption
costs. Olken and Barron (2009) use data from a survey of truck drivers on the
island of Sumatra to show that oﬃcials apply price discrimination to bribes. The
authors use changes in the number of checkpoints to observe that bribe-setting
depends on market structure. Their study focuses on formal operators (truck drivers
employed by formal ﬁrms). Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang (2015) study cross-border
trade in West Africa, also using data on formal operators (registered truck drivers
in Ghana). Their focus is on the "supply side" of bribery (changes in oﬃcials' wage
rates). However, there is, to our knowledge, no quantitative study of bribes paid by
informal traders in Sub-Saharan Africa, or elsewhere.
Our paper's contribution is to provide evidence on the frequency and level of
bribe payments made by informal traders and to identify some of the determinants
of these bribes. Whether bribery is more or less frequent in informal trade, and
whether the mechanisms sustaining corruption are similar to those found among
formal (and generally larger) traders, are open questions that have implications for
trade and development in the region.
ICBT is an important sector of economic activity in Africa. It has been shown
to outstrip formal regional trade for the African countries where data are available
(Ackello-Ogutu and Echessah, 1997; Golub and Mbaye, 2009; World Bank, 2011,
2013; Bensassi et al., 2017, 2018). ICBT in Sub-Saharan Africa also provides much-
needed employment and enables deeper regional integration (Afrika and Ajumbo,
2012; IMF, 2017). At the same time, the informal nature of ICBT might make this
form of trade more prone to bribery.
Our results yield three groups of ﬁndings:
First, we show that bribes are highly frequent in informal cross-border trade.
Overall, about 80% of traders paid a bribe, and this rate is above 60% across all
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categories of traders. Bribe payments are relatively low in comparison to the value
of the goods traded.
Second, we ﬁnd evidence that oﬃcials use price discrimination when setting the
level of bribes, in line with Olken and Barron (2009). However, we also shed light
on new discrimination mechanisms. Informal traders use a large variety of transport
modes to cross borders, which creates variations in the price elasticity of demand
for passage. Traders using lighter or slower modes of transport (such as motorbikes
or pirogues) pay signiﬁcantly lower bribes than traders using trucks.
Finally, we show that trade barriers increase the level of bribes. Using changes in
trade barriers over time, we show that traders of products facing an import ban pay
higher expected bribe payments. Conversely, trade of local unprocessed products,
for which trade impediments have been removed in the region, pay lower bribes.
These results are consistent with collusive bribery.
Overall, our paper depicts an environment of ingrained corruption in ICBT. Our
results suggest that bribery may create incentives for traders to use less eﬃcient
transport modes in order to avoid paying bribes or to make lower expected payments.
Deeper regional integration may reduce bribery.
This paper belongs to several strands of literature.
It contributes to the literature on the determinants of small-scale corruption. An
increasing number of papers have looked at smuggling and corruption in the context
of formal international trade (Yang, 2008; Sequeira and Djankov, 2014; Sequeira,
2016). We establish that price discrimination is used to set bribe levels for ICBT.
Our setting is unique, in that we are able to observe the diﬀerent routes and transport
modes used by traders connecting the same markets. We can thus verify that the
level of bribes depends on the transport mode used.
Our paper also complements a long line of development studies research exam-
ining informal traders' organizations, characteristics, and actions in Sub-Saharan
Africa. These works have focused either on particular economic sectors, speciﬁc
groups of traders, or geographical regions (Igue, 1976; Titeca and de Herdt, 2010;
Titeca and Celestin, 2012; Walther, 2015; Grossman and Honig, 2017). Some have
meticulously described the bribe payment process required to trade goods across
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borders informally (Bako-Arifari, 2001) or the power relations at play between in-
formal traders and customs oﬃcers (van den Boogaard et al., 2018), while others
have focused on the most vulnerable groups of traders (Afrika and Ajumbo, 2012;
Titeca and Celestin, 2012). However, none of these works have studied bribe pay-
ments at a country-wide level where the scope is not limited to particular groups of
traders.
In Section 2, we present the context of ICBT in Benin and introduce our data
set. We also provide descriptive statistics on traders' characteristics, the transac-
tions involved, and bribe payments. In Section 3 we present our empirical strategy.
Section 4 is dedicated to our results. Section 5 follows with some robustness checks.
Section 6 concludes.
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2 Context and Data
2.1 Regional trade integration in West Africa
This paper focuses on trade at the land borders of Benin. Two diﬀerent trade
regimes characterize these borders. Benin is a member of the the Western African
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), a customs union whose members also
include Niger, Burkina-Faso, and Togo. The fourth of Benin's land borders is with
Nigeria, which does not belong to the customs union. Nigeria and Benin share
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) membership, which aims
to promote a West African common market. However, in the period we study (2010-
2011), tariﬀs had not yet been removed between Nigeria and Benin. Nigeria was still
applying non-preferential tariﬀs to imports fromWest African countries. Nigeria also
applied import prohibitions to a list of products.
Tariﬀs have been removed on trade internal to the WAEMU (articles 4 and 77-
81 of the WAEMU treaty), although customs controls still apply in practice. The
common external tariﬀ is applied to non-WAEMU origin goods. Many internal ﬂows
still face duties because they lack a certiﬁcate of origin, or because temporary tariﬀs
and restrictions continue to be applied by member countries (see e.g. ITC (2017)).
Free movement of goods applies, however, to local unprocessed products from the
agriculture, mining, and ﬁshery sectors.2 A certiﬁcate of origin is not required for
these products (Protocole additionnel N. III/2001, UEMOA/WAEMU ), which are
often traded on secondary roads (Egg and Herrera, 1998), avoiding oﬃcial customs
border posts. This type of trade is well measured in the survey data we use. It
provides us with a class of trade ﬂows to which complete trade liberalization applies
and allows us to test whether this aﬀects traders' exposure to bribery. Trade in local
unprocessed goods between ECOWAS members (and so, between Benin and Nigeria)
has also been liberalized since 1993 (Article 36 of the revised treaty.) However, ﬁeld
reports indicate that traders of these goods are still exposed to trade restrictions,
frequent harassment, and bribery at ECOWAS's internal borders (UNECA, 2010;
ITC, 2017).
In 2010 and 2011, Nigeria applied most-favored-nation (MFN) tariﬀs, between
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0% and 35% by product, to imports from all countries (including West African
countries). An additional levy was collected on sugar (10%), automotive products
(20%), and rice (20%) (WTO, 2011).3 In addition, a list of import prohibitions on
more than 25 groups of items was maintained by the Nigerian customs authority,
with regular changes to the list. In July 2011, for example, a number of products
were removed from the list.4 In our empirical analysis, we exploit this change, which
occurred between the two waves of the survey, to estimate the impact of this trade
barrier on the bribes paid by traders.
2.2 Informal trade
In many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, a large share of international trade ﬂows
does not go through oﬃcial customs border posts and is not recorded in oﬃcial
customs data: it is generally called informal cross-border trade. Such ﬂows cover
many products and sectors, and their total value exceeds, in many cases, the value
of oﬃcial trade (Lesser and Moisé-Leeman, 2009; World Bank, 2013; Golub, 2015;
Bensassi et al., 2018).
This form of trade is particularly pervasive in Benin, which led the national
statistics institute (INSAE) to conduct the ECENE survey (Enquête sur le commerce
extérieur non enregistré) in order to better estimate trade ﬂows and measure their
magnitude and composition. Several types of trade are found in this category. First,
there is trade in local or regional products: imports of products from Benin's regional
neighbors (mainly Nigeria and Togo) and exports from Benin to these countries.
These ﬂows are internal to the WAEMU or ECOWAS regional agreements. Among
them, local unprocessed products beneﬁt, in principle, from total free movement.
Traders of transformed products need to present certiﬁcates of origin to beneﬁt
from preferential treatment.
Second, there is a large sector of re-export and transit trade in Benin. Benin and
Togo have long specialized in this entrepôt trade activity (Igue and Soule, 1992),
which involves importing products, mostly from Asia and the EU, and re-exporting
them to neighboring countries (mostly Nigeria).5
These transactions are likely to face higher restrictions than local trade, as most
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of this trade with Nigeria involves the smuggling of high-tax or banned products into
Nigeria. For this reason, we carefully distinguish these trade ﬂows using information
in the data on the type of trade ﬂow (imports, exports, re-exports, or transit) as
well as on the country of origin and destination of the shipments.6
Finally, illicit trade in petroleum products (gasoline) is highly developed between
Nigeria and Benin due to the subsidies available in Nigeria. Although this trade is
illegal, it often takes place in daylight. Our data includes many examples of this
type of transaction.
To summarize, our data covers extremely diverse types of informal cross-border
trade, which, taken together, make up a signiﬁcant share of regional trade (Ben-
sassi et al., 2018). Some of these trades, namely entrepôt trade and gasoline trade,
would qualify as smuggling : their purpose is to avoid taxes, trade restrictions, or
regulations. In our data, these types of trade coexist with trade in local products,
which do not face trade barriers, but may avoid customs for other reasons (such as
compliance or certiﬁcation costs, delays, harassment, or bribery). In our analysis,
we carefully control for the diﬀerent types of trade and test how exposure to bribery
varies across them.
Given that Benin has one of the lowest ratios of customs oﬃcers per kilometer of
land border (0.34) in the region, Benin's borders could be characterized as porous
(Table 1). Nonetheless, having porous borders does not mean that this porosity is
not managed. Customs agents pay individuals to serve as a supplementary force to
inform them of movements of goods and to provide control outside the border posts.
This supplementary force in turn accepts bribes from traders in return for failing to
inform the agents (Blundo and de Sardan, 2007).
Table 1: Number of customs oﬃcers per kilometer of land border
Benin Burkina Faso Niger Nigeria Togo
Number of customs oﬃcers 723 1795 1502 17570 748
Length of land border (km) 2123 3611 5834 4477 1880
Ratio 0.34 0.49 0.25 3.92 0.39
Source: World Customs Organization and CIA 2016
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2.3 Data
Our main source of data is the ECENE survey conducted by the INSAE in order to
estimate the size and composition of informal trade more precisely and to account for
this component in the national accounts. The ﬁrst wave was conducted in January
2010, the second in September 2011.
The institute ﬁrst identiﬁed 150 illegal border crossing points that were actively
used by informal traders, scattered all along Benin's land borders. According to
the INSAE, this coverage of illegal crossing points was exhaustive at the time of the
survey. Most crossing points were located on secondary roads. 48 points were located
close to a water passage: this is important as a signiﬁcant part of informal trade is
transported on pirogues, due to the existence of cross-border streams. Before the
second wave of the survey, a second monitoring of crossing points was conducted and
the list was updated. 171 points were identiﬁed in 2011 (most of them are common
with the 2010 list). Figure 1 shows the coverage of the 2011 survey points.7 The
survey was designed to cover the diverse routes that connect Benin to its neighbours
and that are used by traders: all-weather highways , an extensive network of bush
and rural roads (Afolayan, 2000), as well as a network of inland waterways (Azonsi
et al., 2018).
In January 2010, the 150 points were surveyed over a 7-consecutive-day period
by a team of 225 surveyors, 12 controllers, and 6 supervisors. In 2011, the operation
was repeated, with the 171 points surveyed over 10 consecutive days (employing 350
surveyors, 30 controllers, and 12 supervisors).
A four-page questionnaire was completed by surveyors and traders. Information
on the nature, quantity, and value of goods transported, the origin and destination
of the shipments, and the transport mode was collected. In 2011, a total of 8,883
questionnaires were completed (5,173 in 2010) (INSAE, 2011). After data cleaning,
8,610 observations from 2011 were retained for analysis (5,045 in 2010). The unit of
observation is a trader's crossing. Most traders were surveyed only once, although
it is possible that traders crossing several times during the survey period could have
been interviewed more than once.8
9
Figure 1: Map of surveyed border crossings (2011 survey). Source: INSAE.
Products were codiﬁed at a high level of detail (using the ten-digit codes of the
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, HS-10).9
Trade ﬂows were classiﬁed as exports, imports, re-exports, and transit. The latter
two categories correspond to ﬂows of goods originating in third countries (typically
in Asia or Europe) that enter Benin (possibly legally) before crossing one of Benin's
land borders to reach one of the neighboring countries. We retain all these trade
regimes in our analysis, but control for entrepôt trade, which may face higher trade
barriers than domestic trade, and thus higher exposure to bribery.
Previous studies on trade in the region have underlined the quantitative impor-
tance of entrepôt trade (Igue and Soule, 1992; Golub, 2012). In our data, entrepôt
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trade and gasoline smuggling are the largest types of trade in value (see Table 4).
The value of entrepôt trade is larger than that of imports and exports (trade of
domestic products with Benin's direct neighbors), which include more numerous,
but lower-value transactions. Table 2 indicates the nature, the main origin, and the
main destination of the ﬁve products most exchanged through entrepôt trade. Our
data is consistent with the literature on entrepôt trade: products banned or heavily
taxed in Nigeria compose most of it.
Table 2: Statistics: Entrepôt Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Type Total Value Traded Share of Total Main Country Main Country
of goods ('000 USD) Entrepôt Trade (%) of Origin* of Destination*
Cars 2145 32.5 France (28.2) Nigeria (89.0)
Rice 1850 28.0 Thailand (87.7) Nigeria (90.5)
Footwear 1112 16.8 China (99.2) Nigeria (99.8)
Palm oil 347 5.2 Malaysia (70.8) Nigeria (86.3)
Frozen chicken 272 4.1 France (92.1) Nigeria (100)
Source: ECENE survey 2010 and 2011.
* Numbers in parenthesis show the share represented by the main country of origin/destination
in the entrepôt trade for the product indicated in each row
The data are consistent with other studies on entrepôt trade, which is a good sign
in terms of the quality of the data and the survey's ability to mitigate the risk of
sample selection. Another indication is that the smuggling of gasoline from Nigeria,
which is completely illegal and strongly repressed, is heavily represented in the data,
with more than 4,012 observations in the original database (among these, 3,734
replied to the question on bribes). The fact that so many traders involved in illegal
trade would agree to participate in a survey supervised by a public body may seem
surprising. It is a consequence of the pervasiveness of informal trade in the region
and of the blurred line between legal and illegal trade operations,with the latter
commonly taking place in daylight. It is also a testimony to the INSAE's eﬀorts in
conducting the survey (INSAE, 2011). For example, the survey was conducted in
cooperation with the customs administration to ensure that customs agents' control
operations would not interfere with the conduct of the survey.
Concerns regarding sample selection are thus limited given that the trade activ-
ities facing the highest levels of risk and repression are frequently observed in the
survey and do not appear to be signiﬁcantly under-reported. Selection issues remain
11
possible, however, in particular because some of these trade operations are known to
take place at night (and are therefore not covered by the survey). A related concern
is that replies of traders engaged in these activities might be missing more often, or
be less truthful. To address this concern, we conduct a number of tests to determine
the sensitivity of our results to excluding these high-risk products, as presented in
the empirical section of the article.
2.4 Bribes
Each trader was asked for the amount of informal tax paid during his or her travel.
This question includes all payments made during the transport of a good for which
the trader received no oﬃcial receipts. Accordingly, this variable potentially includes
payments made to the military, police, or customs oﬃcers. Unfortunately, we have
no information on the recipients of these payments.10 In this paper, we use the term
bribes for informal taxes, the term used in the survey.11
The two waves of the ECENE survey contain 13,655 observations (crossings).
Among these, the informal tax question is missing in 678 cases in 2011 and 229
in 2010 (overall rate of 6.6%). The stigma associated with paying bribes, if there is
one, is thus relatively uncommon.
There is a risk that these non-responses may depend on some determinants of
bribes. The data show that this issue is limited. For example, the non-response
rate is 7% for traders of gasoline and 6.5% for other traders; the diﬀerence is not
signiﬁcant. To test this further, we ran probit estimates of the probability of non-
response to the bribe question: the results are displayed in Table 3. Almost none
of our variables of interest are signiﬁcantly associated with a higher or lower rate
of non-response. These results conﬁrm that the risk of non-response does not vary
signiﬁcantly according to the type of trade. Paying a bribe is the norm rather than
the exception among traders, as evidenced by the frequency of payment in our data.
No particular stigma appears to be associated with it.
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Table 3: Informal tax: determinants of non-response (probit)
(1) (2)
Weight -0.00 0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Unit value 0.02 0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Multiproduct -0.15 -0.13
(0.10) (0.09)
Entrepôt trade -0.10 -0.18
(0.13) (0.14)
Petroleum products 0.15 0.10
(0.15) (0.14)
Local unprocessed 0.18** 0.17**
products (0.09) (0.08)
WAEMU 0.09 0.10
(0.25) (0.24)
Tariﬀ -0.27 -0.12
(1.08) (1.00)
Import ban 0.11 0.04
(0.22) (0.22)
Transport mode:
Bicycle/pedestrian 0.40*
(0.24)
Pirogues 0.15
(0.22)
Motorcycles 0.19
(0.20)
Cars 0.16
(0.17)
Nb. of workers -0.01
(0.08)
Wholesalers 0.10
(0.09)
Frequency -0.04
(0.08)
Beninese -0.03
(0.11)
Year 2011 0.30* 0.32*
(0.15) (0.17)
Observations 13387 13285
Pseudo R2 0.018 0.025
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by crossing point.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01
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2.4.1 Bribe frequency and levels
Table 4 provides statistics on the structure of informal trade at Benin's borders and
on bribery. In panel A, we split the sample by type of trade. In terms of value traded,
the largest categories are entrepôt trade and the smuggling of gasoline. Columns 3
and 4 display the incidence of informal and formal taxes, i.e. the frequency of
positive payments. Column 5 shows the average bribe payment made by traders
during their journey to the border, as a percentage of total cargo value. Column 6
shows the average formal tax rate paid by traders.
It emerges, ﬁrst, that bribe payments are highly frequent across all trade cat-
egories: they are the norm rather than the exception. This conﬁrms that bribery
is pervasive in the countries we consider. Note that these ﬁgures also minimize the
concern that respondents might be reluctant to report paying bribes. Bribes are
more frequent for entrepôt trade and gasoline smuggling, which face more trade bar-
riers than trade in domestic products. However, the average value of bribes, as a
share of cargo value, appears to be lower for these categories.
The ubiquity of bribes suggests that collusion - payments made to avoid the
payment of formal taxes or regulations - is not the only motive for these payments.
Panel C shows that trade at Benin's WAEMU borders, which should be more inte-
grated, experiences a lower bribe incidence than that at Nigeria's border, although
it remains above 60%. Similarly, trade in unprocessed products (panel B), which in
principle beneﬁts from free movement at Benin's borders, experiences scarcely less
frequent bribery than other ﬂows.
Panel D splits the sample by transportation mode. The largest share of trade
(38%) is conducted using pirogues, followed by trucks (34%). The remaining share
employs cars, pedestrians, and motorcycles. Bribe payments are particularly fre-
quent for truck and car users. A stylized fact emerges: traders using lighter modes
of transport tend to pay lower bribes, and lower formal taxes (relative to traded
value), than trucks.12 These features will be further examined in the econometric
analysis.
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Table 4: Statistics: payment frequency and value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total value traded Number Bribe Formal tax Bribe Formal tax
('000 USD) of obs. incidence (%) incidence (%) ratio (%) ratio(%)
Panel A: trade category
Entrepôt trade 6237 1599 85.1 25.9 1.24 1.23
Gasoline 9755 3706 89.4 37.2 2.16 0.63
Exports 3260 2480 71.0 35.7 2.25 1.04
Imports (excl. gasoline) 2579 4399 70.1 35.3 2.76 1.22
Regional trade 2395 289 79.6 38.1 2.28 0.72
Panel B: product type
Unprocessed pdts. 5894 3721 71.6 39.2 2.33 0.94
Other Products 8577 5046 74.8 29.8 2.31 1.31
Panel C: border
Nigeria 21845 7806 86 31.8 2.13 0.96
WAEMU Countries 2381 4667 65.1 39.9 2.51 1.06
Panel D: transport mode
Trucks 7964 1175 92.3 59.2 3.08 1.89
Bicycle/pedestrians 2154 2255 69.9 26.2 2.17 0.68
Pirogues 8922 3135 74.8 35.5 1.94 1.17
Motorcycles 645 3541 79 28.7 2.06 0.68
Cars 3661 2283 82.1 39.6 2.78 1.1
Source: ECENE survey 2010 and 2011. Regional trade includes re-export and transit ﬂows
with a regional (West African) country of provenance.
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2.4.2 Bribe payments: comparison with trade costs and with existing
estimates
To put the ﬁgures on bribe payments into perspective, we compare them to the
tariﬀs traders would have paid using formal trade routes and to the bribes that have
been reported as being paid on formal routes in other studies.
Trade between Benin and its WAEMU partners, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Togo,
is, in principle, liberalized. In practice, evidence suggests that many trade ﬂows in-
ternal to the WAEMU area nonetheless face trade restrictions, in particular because
of costly origin certiﬁcation. Unprocessed products are the only items that do not
require a certiﬁcate to be traded inside the WAEMU.13 If certiﬁcates of origin are
not provided, customs agents should consider the products in question as not being
produced in the WAEMU and should revert to the common external tariﬀ (between
5% and 20%). In the case of trade with Nigeria, no preferential treatment applied to
trade from Benin in 2011. The maximum rate on Nigeria's imports was 35%, with
additional levies on some products. We compute the average most-favored nation
(MFN) rate that would have been applied to shipments at the borders of Benin with
WAEMU partners in cases where no certiﬁcate of origin was provided, and the rate
applied to shipments at the border with Nigeria. We obtain an average MFN of
14.9%, compared to 3.57%, the sum of the informal and formal tax ratios, paid by
informal traders for the WAEMU trade. In the case of Nigeria, the average MFN
is 14.1%, compared to a ratio of 3.09%. These numbers provide an estimate of the
diﬀerence between the de jure tax rates applied to shipments and the de facto pay-
ments made by traders. They suggest that actual payments are considerably below
the duty that would apply.
How do our ﬁgures on bribe payments compare with other studies on petty
corruption?
The context examined by Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang (2015) is the closest to our
case: their study is based on a survey of truck drivers involved in cross-border trade
between Ghana and Burkina-Faso. The incidence of bribery they report appears to
be consistent with our ﬁgures: the unconditional probability of not paying a bribe
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at a stop is between 4.6% and 13% (based on 2,147 trucking trips surveyed). Their
survey focused on trucks plying a single route. Importantly, this route is an oﬃcial
one, being the main road linking Accra to Ouagadougou; and the survey selected
truck drivers with papers for the truck and cargo ... in order. Thus, the trucks in
their survey qualify as being part of the formal trade sector, while our focus is on
informal traders. A high frequency of bribery is clearly not a speciﬁcity of informal
trade, although levels of payment may diﬀer.14
Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2009) report estimates of the share of bribes in
relation to variable costs for trucks operating on the main trade corridors in Africa.
Looking at the bribe to fuel costs ratio, which oﬀers the most direct comparison,
their ﬁgures are between 8% and 71% for West and Central Africa. We ﬁnd a mean
value of 94%, and a median of 26%, for the same variable. This is consistent with
their statement that bribe costs are higher for informal trade operations, the focus
of our study, than for other type of trade actors.
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2.4.3 Sample statistics
Table 5 displays descriptive statistics for our estimation sample. The distribution
of the size of shipments is skewed, with many small-scale shipments and a few large
ones. This reﬂects the high diversity of our data in terms of trader types and
transport modes.
Distance measures the road distance between a shipment's market of origin and
the border crossing point where the survey took place. We used data from the
Google maps API on driving and walking itineraries between each pair of locations.
The walking itinerary reports the shortest route on secondary/bush roads available
in the application. It is therefore relevant for both pedestrians and motorcycles, and
is shorter than the driving route in most cases.15 We applied the driving distance
to traders using cars and trucks. We thus measure the actual distance traveled by
each trader as accurately as possible.16 Note that the route is generally located in
Benin, in the case of exports, re-exports, and transit; or in one of the neighboring
countries, in the case of imports.
Distance is missing in cases where the market of origin could not be located on
the map. We thus ran our estimations on both the subsample with the distance
variable, and on the whole sample, omitting distance, in order to verify that our
results hold in both cases.
Distance to oﬃcial post measures the distance between the survey's border cross-
ing and the nearest oﬃcial customs post. A list of 45 customs points with their
location was built using Beninese customs' codes (code des douanes), as well as
additional sources for secondary points.
About one third of traders were operating within the WAEMU area (i.e. the
goods' countries of origin and destination were both WAEMU members). Traders of
local unprocessed products made up 30% of observations. Gasoline smugglers made
up another 30%. About 9% of shipments contained products facing an import ban
in Nigeria.
Nigeria's oﬃcial tariﬀ schedule, in 2010-2011, included ﬁve bands from 0% to
35% ad-valorem rates. In addition, the country also applied excise duties and levies
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to speciﬁc products, such as rice, palm oil, and automobile parts (WTO, 2011). We
included these additional taxes in the computation of our tariﬀ variable (in the case
of multiproduct shipments, a sum of tariﬀs weighted by traded value). Nigeria's
trade policy also includes a list of products banned for import, which was coded
using the oﬃcial list from Nigeria's customs authority. In the case of import ﬂows
into Benin, the WAEMU's external tariﬀ applies, which has four bands ranging from
0% to 20%.
It is possible that the tariﬀ and ban variables do not capture the entirety of
Nigeria's complex trade restrictions. In our empirical analysis, we rely on models
with product ﬁxed eﬀects (at SH4 product code level) to control for unobserved
trade barriers.
Beyond cargo size, we used two proxies for the size of the trader's ﬁrm: the total
number of co-workers as reported by the trader (including temporary and permanent
workers) and a dummy for traders who reported having wholesalers as main clients
or suppliers (Wholesalers). The majority of traders operate alone. Frequency is
the number of months before the survey in which the trader reported having made
at least one passage (the survey asked for detailed activity month by month). Most
traders operate regularly, throughout the year.
69% of traders were men, based on the 2011 survey data. This information was
not available in the 2010 data.17
The last line of the table reports the number of distinct border crossings used
by traders who connect the same markets (same origin and destination markets).
This is a de facto measure of the number of alternative routes that traders can use.
This number of alternatives varies by transport mode. We computed the number
of alternative routes connecting two markets used by traders with a given transport
mode. Figure 2 shows the distribution of this variable for each mode of transport.
For trucks, cars, and pedestrians, the number of routes is most often between one and
three. By contrast, this number is most often higher for pirogues and motorcycles,
and can reach up to ten. Traders on pirogues or motorcycles have access to a greater
number of alternative routes, and this could lower their willingness to pay at a given
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Table 5: Statistics on estimation sample
Mean Median Min Max Std. dev. Nb. Obs
Cargo value (USD) 1942.34 182.91 0.2 384279.5 9589.61 12473
Weight (kg.) 2479.75 250 0.68 500000 10990.12 12473
Multiproduct 0.13 0 0 1 0.34 12473
Distance (km.) 79.32 31.9 .002 923.05 129.10 7521
Distance to
oﬃcial post (km.) 13.56 9.74 .02 69.50 13.37 12340
Trade regime
WAEMU 0.34 0 0 1 0.47 12473
Entrepôt trade 0.13 0 0 1 0.34 12473
Gasoline 0.30 0 0 1 0.46 12473
Local unprocessed 0.30 0 0 1 0.46 12473
products
Tariﬀ (%) 10.4 7.8 0 45 10.6 12473
Import ban 0.09 0 0 1 0.29 12473
Trader characteristics
Nb. of workers 2.64 1 1 143 5.07 12473
Wholesalers 0.36 0 0 1 0.48 12473
Beninese 0.72 1 0 1 0.45 12473
Frequency of passage 9.81 12 1 12 3.33 12473
Male (2011 only) 0.69 1 0 1 0.46 6023
Nb. of crossing points 3.02 2 1 23 3.94 12473
per market pair
Source: INSAE, ECENE survey 2010 and 2011, authors' computations.
point. We test whether bribes are set accordingly lower for these categories of trader.
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 2 4 6 8 10
Nb. of crossing points by market pair
Trucks Bicycle/pedestrian
Pirogues Motorcycles
Cars
Figure 2: Number of crossing points: cumulative distribution by mode of transport
20
3 Empirical methodology
Our theoretical background is a model of a public oﬃcial who sets the level of
bribes in order to maximize revenue, similar to the approach of Olken and Barron
(2009). The oﬃcial may be a customs oﬃcer (or a supplementary person reporting
to customs), a policeman, or another oﬃcial who stands on a road and has some
power to control passage. Abundant evidence exists on the numerous checkpoints
that are found on roads in the region.
The oﬃcial can take into account the trader's observable characteristics, such as
the nature, size, and value of cargo, the mode of transport, and the type of trader,
and price discriminate accordingly. A trader's willingness to pay for passage will
generally not be perfectly observed by the oﬃcial, who can nonetheless use third
degree discrimination. In cases where a tariﬀ or trade restriction applies to the
product, the oﬃcial may also demand a payment in exchange for not applying the
duty, ﬁne, or sanction (i.e. a collusive bribe).
The traders in our data may have paid one or several bribes; however, we only
observe the total payment as reported by the trader. We model the expected pay-
ment in exponential form, controlling for distance traveled. The distance variable is
transport-mode speciﬁc, and is measured as described in the previous section. We
expect total expected payment to increase with distance (as the expected number
of stops increases), and study the impact of trader and cargo characteristics on the
expected bribe, conditional on distance.18
We estimate our model of expected payment using Poisson quasi-maximum like-
lihood estimation. The conditional expected bribe payment is assumed to take the
form:
E[InfTaxikt|Di, Qi, UVi, Xikt] = λt.Dαi Qβ1i UV β2i .exp(γXikt) (1)
where InfTaxikt is the total bribe paid by a trader i of good k, surveyed in year
t. As explained in Section 2, this variable sums all the payments without receipts
made by the trader during the passage.
Qi and UVi are the quantity and unit value of the trader's cargo. Qi ∗UVi is the
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total cargo value. (In the case of multiproduct cargo, the unit value is computed as
the weighted average of the prices of the goods.) Di is the road distance between
the origin market and the border crossing point where the survey took place. Xic
is a set of trader and cargo characteristics. They include measures of the trade
regime (tariﬀs and bans at product level; indicator variables for within-WAEMU
trade, for entrepôt trade, for trade of unprocessed local products - to which free
movement applies -, and for gasoline products - which are illegal); transport mode
(truck, motorcycle, pirogue, car, or pedestrian); and the trader's nationality (Benin
or other), sex, and self-declared frequency of passage.
We also include measures of the number of alternative roads available to traders.
We ﬁrst built an interaction term stream * non water transport, a dummy equal to
one if the respondent does not use a pirogue despite there being traders who started
from the same origin market using pirogues. Second, we computed the number of
crossings in the vicinity of each given crossing point.19 These measures are intended
to test the eﬀect of traders' existing alternatives on bribes paid.
As shown in Wooldridge (2017), the Poisson QML estimator is consistent under
the assumption that the conditional mean of the dependent variable is correctly
speciﬁed in Equation 1. In particular, it is not necessary for the dependent variable to
actually follow a Poisson distribution; there are no additional requirements regarding
the variance of the dependent variable.
An alternative to the Poisson QML estimator is the negative binomial model,
estimated by full maximum likelihood. This model is intended to model a variable
that exhibits overdispersion - i.e. where the variance is superior to the mean.20
Note, however, that the Poisson QML estimator is also eﬃcient in the case of over-
dispersion. In the case of over-dispersion, the actual form of the variance determines
which model is more eﬃcient - the Poisson QML or the negative binomial model.21
In our case, we rely primarily on the Poisson QML estimator. This model has
the additional advantage of not suﬀering from the incidental parameters issue, which
allows us to estimate models with sets of ﬁxed eﬀects without risk of bias in the co-
eﬃcients. As a robustness check, we ran our estimations with the negative binomial
model to check that our results were not dramatically diﬀerent with this alternative
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model.
4 Results
4.1 Expected payment
Table 6 reports the results of our estimation of model 1 by Poisson quasi-maximum
likelihood. The dependent variable is a trader's expected bribe payment. Standard
errors are clustered at the level of border crossing points.22 Coeﬃcients are to be
interpreted as elasticities. In columns 4 and 5, we use ﬁxed eﬀects for the trader's
market of origin, in order to control for unobserved, time-constant market charac-
teristics (such as market size). In column 5, we add sector (4-digit HS code) ﬁxed
eﬀects, which control for unobserved characteristics of the products traded that may
aﬀect bribes.
Our results show that the average bribe payment is positively correlated with
cargo value (weight and unit value). The two coeﬃcients are smaller than one, mean-
ing that amounts paid increase less than proportionately with cargo value. Payments
are also positively correlated with the road distance traveled by the trader, as are
exposure to bribery and the expected number of payments. Distance measures road
distance taking into account the trader's transport mode. In the case of pirogues,
we add an interaction term with distance in order to control for the speciﬁcity of
this transport mode.
The distance from the border crossing to the nearest oﬃcial customs post is
negatively associated with bribes, signiﬁcantly in columns 4 and 5. This may reﬂect
the fact that controls are more likely in the vicinity of customs posts.
Bribes vary by trade regime. Traders of local unprocessed products, which ben-
eﬁt from complete liberalization, pay lower bribes. Traders operating within the
WAEMU area, where trade barriers are lower, also tend to pay lower bribes, al-
though the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant. Gasoline smugglers pay higher average amounts,
although the impact is, perhaps surprisingly, not so high: these traders pay an
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amount about 50% higher, on average, than the amount paid by traders of other
products with otherwise similar values and characteristics. These results are consis-
tent with collusive bribery, which serves in part to avoid a restriction, regulation, or
the payment of tax.
Contrary to this result, however, the coeﬃcient for the tariﬀ variable (applied
by the importing country) and entrepôt trade are negative. One possibility is that
traders of products facing high protection invest more resources in order to avoid
the payment of bribes. We further investigate the impact of tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ
barriers in the next set of results, by using product ﬁxed-eﬀect estimates and the
impact of changes in trade barriers between 2010 and 2011.
Bribes also vary in function of a trader's transport mode and characteristics.
Traders operating on motorcycles pay signiﬁcantly lower amounts, for otherwise
similar cargo. This is also the case for pedestrians. The average bribe paid by
motorcycles is about 65% (based on column 5) lower than that paid by trucks.
These eﬀects are consistent with price discrimination being used to determine bribe
amounts. The demand for passage of a trader on a motorcycle is likely to be more
price elastic than other transport modes, as the trader has access to greater numbers
of alternative routes than traders using other transport modes. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that motorcycles are used precisely for this reason: to avoid controls and
payments. On the other hand, pedestrians may be less ﬂexible in their choice of route
but have a lower willingness to pay for passage. The stream * non water transport
variable is equal to one for traders who do not use pirogues, despite operating in
an area (deﬁned by the origin market) where transport on pirogues exists. This
variable is used to test whether the possibility of water transport inﬂuences the
level of bribes paid by other transport modes, through a competition eﬀect between
alternative crossing points. Results indicate that it does. The eﬀect is also negative,
and signiﬁcant, when controlling for origin market ﬁxed eﬀects (column 4): in that
model, the coeﬃcient measures the eﬀect of changes in streams between the two
survey periods.23
We also use controls for trader characteristics - nationality, frequency of passage,
and two proxies for the size of the trader's ﬁrm: the reported number of co-workers
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and whether the trader reported having wholesalers as main clients or suppliers.
Beyond cargo size, the trader's operating size may be partially observable to a bribe-
taking oﬃcial, who could use this information to price discriminate. Results indicate
that size is positively associated with bribes.
Impact of trade policy variables The tariﬀs and bans applied by the importing
country vary at product (HS-6) level. Our estimates, thus far, capture both the eﬀect
of diﬀerences in trade barriers over time and across products in a given sector. The
cross-sectional variation in protection could be correlated with unobserved variables:
such as traders' investment and eﬀorts to avoid controls. Non-tariﬀ barriers, which
we do not observe perfectly, could also be correlated with tariﬀs.
In order to focus on the impact of changes in protection over time, we turn to
estimates of a model including product-origin-destination ﬁxed eﬀects (at the HS-6
level). This speciﬁcation fully controls for all constant trade barriers. It also controls
for the non-time-variable component of demand and supply for trade at the product
level (such as product demand in the destination country). This model estimates
the impact of changes in protection over time. In July 2011, the list of products
prohibited for import in Nigeria was shortened.24
This model thus yields a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate of the impact of import
bans on bribes. Products that remained on the prohibition list serve as the control
group, to which we compare the changes in bribes for products that were removed
from the list. Note that the survey took place shortly (two months) after the change
in the list, so we focus on the short-term impact of the change. The informal trade
sector's adjustments to the change may not have occurred at the time of the survey.
Regarding tariﬀs, only a few products in our data experienced a change in tariﬀ
protection between the two surveys (this concerns three product-level tariﬀ changes
in the WAEMU's external tariﬀ, and three changes in Nigeria's MFN rate). This
limits our ability to obtain a realistic estimate of the eﬀect of tariﬀ changes in this
setting.
Table 7 displays the results of estimates of the product-origin-destination ﬁxed ef-
fects model. In columns 1 and 2, we restrict the sample to single-product shipments.
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In columns 3 and 4, we include multi-product shipments (in order to attribute a ﬁxed
eﬀect to the shipment, the main product is taken to be the one with the highest
total value in the shipment).
Our results indicate that import bans are positively correlated with bribe amounts
paid. Traders of products on the prohibition list are expected to pay bribes about
twice as high (exp(1.09) − 1 = 1.97) as traders of other products. The removal of
some products from the list appears to have reduced the bribes paid by traders of
these products, possibly because the threat of conﬁscation or penalty cannot be used
by the oﬃcial to extract bribes. This is consistent with collusive bribery. However,
we cannot entirely exclude the possibility that other mechanisms are at work. (For
instance, the removal of a ban could lower a product's price in Nigeria, reducing
traders' margins and, hence, their willingness to pay for passage.) Regarding tariﬀs,
coeﬃcients are negative but not signiﬁcant.
Number of crossing points In the next set of results, we further test the impact
of alternative routes on the level of bribes by including the number of near crossings
in the model. This variable can, however, be endogenous. It is possible, for instance,
that traders facing higher bribe prices will invest more eﬀort and resources in order to
ﬁnd, and use, alternative routes. To address this endogeneity, we use an instrument
based on the local environment: the terrain ruggedness index, which measures the
average local slope in an area.25
We expect ruggedness to be associated with higher road building costs, and to
thus constrain the number of alternative routes that can be used to link two points.
For the instrument to be valid, ruggedness must not aﬀect bribe levels through
any other channel (apart from the number of routes). A threat to this assumption
is that ruggedness could directly aﬀect the transport costs incurred by traders, e.g.
by lengthening the road distance connecting two points. In turn, transport costs
might inﬂuence a trader's capacity to pay. We control for transport costs with
the distance and transport mode variables. Our distance variable is speciﬁc to the
transport mode and measures the actual road distance traveled. Conditional on
transport costs, ruggedness should not inﬂuence bribes other than through its eﬀect
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on alternative routes.
Table 9 presents the results of our estimates of the inﬂuence of alternative routes.
Number of near crossings is the number of recorded crossings within an 8 km distance
of the surveyed point (which is twice the median value of distance to the nearest
crossing point).
In column 1, we use Poisson QML estimates. In columns 2 and 3, we rely on
a linear model and use 2SLS estimates, restricting the sample to observations with
positive values for the bribe payment. In column 4, we use an IV Poisson model
estimated by the control function approach. This estimate is not consistent when
including ﬁxed eﬀects in the model.
The lower part of the table reports results from the ﬁrst stage estimation (2SLS)
and from the equation for number of crossings (IV Poisson).
These results show that ruggedness negatively predicts the number of crossings.
The instrument is moderately strong. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic is about 7.
The number of near crossings is associated with lower bribes in the Poisson
model. However, when instrumenting the model, we cannot conﬁrm that this link
is causal, since the coeﬃcient is non signiﬁcant.
Testing for sex discrimination There is a concern that women suﬀer speciﬁcally
from harassment and violence from oﬃcials. For example, Brenton et al. (2011)
argue that small-scale women traders face gender-speciﬁc constraints. These include
household commitments and a higher risk of violence and vulnerability.26
To the best of our knowledge, however, there are no systematic quantitative data
studies of diﬀerences in treatment between male and female traders with respect to
bribe payments.
Our data allow us to test whether bribes paid by female traders diﬀer system-
atically from those paid by men with otherwise similar observable characteristics -
goods and quantities traded, transport modes, distance traveled. To do this, how-
ever, we have to rely on the 2011 survey data, as information on individuals' sex is
only available in that dataset. Our results are shown in Table 10.
Traders' sex is not associated with any signiﬁcant diﬀerence for the sample as a
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whole (columns 1-3). When focusing on pedestrians only, it appears that women do
pay signiﬁcantly more than men (col. 4-6). This eﬀect is not signiﬁcant for the other
transport modes in the data. The eﬀect is large and signiﬁcant when controlling for
sector ﬁxed-eﬀects. However, the sample size is much reduced, and results need to
be treated with caution.27
These results appear consistent with the hypothesis that female traders are more
vulnerable than male traders, and that this translates into higher bribes. As pointed
out earlier, our results seem to indicate that bribes are, at least in part, coercive.
Qualitative evidence, for example as reported in Brenton et al. (2011), shows that for
traders operating on foot, extraction of bribes can take the form of pure extortion.
Importantly, this diﬀerence is conditional on transport modes. For example, no such
eﬀect appears among traders using pirogues, which has the highest share of female
traders in our data (45%).
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Table 6: Bribe payments (Poisson QML)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Weight 0.73*** 0.62*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.56***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Unit value 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.39***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Distance 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.42*** 0.36***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Distance * 0.00 0.13 0.08 -0.11 -0.11
pirogue (0.03) (0.19) (0.17) (0.20) (0.20)
Distance to 0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.13*** -0.16***
oﬃcial point (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Multiproduct -0.02 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
Entrepôt trade -0.47* -0.36 -0.30 -0.01 -0.15
(0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.23) (0.30)
Petroleum products 0.46* 0.56** 0.47**
(0.24) (0.23) (0.21)
Local products -0.49***-0.50***-0.50***
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
WAEMU -0.15 -0.06 -0.07 -0.42 -0.08
(0.33) (0.32) (0.28) (0.26) (0.29)
Tariﬀ -0.89 -0.17 0.12 -2.34*** 0.85
(1.26) (1.22) (1.10) (0.80) (1.48)
Import ban -0.54** -0.66** -0.56** 0.43** -0.07
(0.26) (0.27) (0.25) (0.21) (0.40)
Transport mode:
Bicycle/pedestrian -0.78***-0.72***-0.57*** -0.59***
(0.24) (0.25) (0.21) (0.21)
Pirogues -2.00 -1.55 0.77 0.96
(2.08) (1.84) (2.42) (2.34)
Motorcycles -1.25***-1.18***-0.97*** -1.07***
(0.29) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23)
Cars -0.28 -0.26 -0.31** -0.25
(0.18) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16)
Stream * non-water transport -0.51***-0.52***-0.87** -0.51
(0.14) (0.15) (0.36) (0.34)
Trader characteristics:
Frequency 0.00 0.03 0.10
(0.13) (0.10) (0.10)
Beninese nationality 0.02 0.09 0.00
(0.15) (0.15) (0.12)
Nb. of workers 0.29*** 0.23*** 0.22***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Wholesalers 0.41*** 0.38*** 0.47***
(0.12) (0.10) (0.09)
Year 2011 -0.45** -0.32* -0.27 -0.06 -0.05
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16)
Origin market f.e. X X
Sector (SH4) f.e. X
Observations 7519 7519 7519 7519 7519
Pseudo R2 0.573 0.596 0.624 0.721 0.754
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by border crossings.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01
Dependent variable: expected bribe payment. Local products: 1 for unprocessed products
from the ECOWAS region, which beneﬁt from free movement within the WAEMU and
ECOWAS areas. Transport mode: Trucks are the omitted category. Stream * non-water
transport : equals 1 if the transport mode is not a pirogue, despite trade by pirogue existing
between the same origin and destination markets. Frequency: nb. of passages reported by
the trader in the 12 months before the survey. Wholesalers: 1 if traders declare that they
have wholesalers as their main clients or suppliers.
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Table 7: Bribe payments (Poisson QML), product-origin-destination ﬁxed eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Single-product only
Weight 0.76*** 0.56*** 0.77*** 0.56***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Unit value 0.60*** 0.44*** 0.58*** 0.42***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07)
Distance 0.22*** 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.19***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Distance * 0.01 0.13 -0.00 0.10
pirogue (0.03) (0.21) (0.03) (0.19)
Distance to 0.06 -0.05 0.06 -0.04
oﬃcial post (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Multiproduct 0.08 0.04
(0.21) (0.18)
Tariﬀ -5.43 -6.70 -5.47 -6.90
(27.85) (23.65) (5.31) (4.64)
Import ban 1.99*** 1.43** 1.07 1.09**
(0.61) (0.58) (0.85) (0.55)
Bicycle/pedestrian -0.92*** -0.91***
(0.22) (0.21)
Pirogues -1.89 -1.75
(2.26) (2.07)
Motorcycles -1.16*** -1.24***
(0.25) (0.24)
Cars -0.19 -0.24
(0.18) (0.17)
Stream * non-water transport -0.40*** -0.38***
(0.14) (0.14)
Frequency 0.05 0.08
(0.14) (0.13)
Beninese 0.04 0.11
(0.17) (0.15)
Nb. of workers 0.35*** 0.34***
(0.07) (0.07)
Wholesalers 0.49*** 0.54***
(0.11) (0.11)
Year 2011 -0.42** -0.29 -0.33 -0.20
(0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20)
Observations 6373 6373 7519 7519
Pseudo R2 0.661 0.712 0.660 0.713
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by border crossing.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01
Model includes ﬁxed eﬀects for product (HS-6 code), country of origin, and country of destination
groups. In columns 1 and 2, multi-product shipments are excluded.
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Table 8: Bribe payments: number of crossings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poisson 2SLS IV Poisson
Nb. near crossings -0.08*** -0.03 -0.02 0.03
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11)
Weight 0.63*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.67***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Unit value 0.44*** 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.58***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Distance 0.21*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Distance * pirogue 0.10 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.21) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Distance to -0.12* 0.10 0.09 0.10
oﬃcial point (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.18)
Multiproduct -0.07 -0.13 -0.14* -0.20*
(0.15) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11)
Entrepôt trade -0.29 -0.23* -0.16 -0.01
(0.26) (0.12) (0.14) (0.17)
Petroleum products 0.57** 0.29** 0.64 0.17
(0.22) (0.12) (0.50) (0.15)
Local products -0.47*** -0.20** 0.46 -0.29***
(0.14) (0.08) (0.35) (0.07)
Bicycle/pedestrian -0.64*** -0.66***-0.71*** -1.01***
(0.24) (0.20) (0.20) (0.26)
Pirogues -1.27 -0.28 -0.24 -0.79
(2.29) (1.01) (0.93) (1.23)
Motorcycles -1.09*** -0.83***-0.80*** -0.98***
(0.29) (0.15) (0.16) (0.20)
Cars -0.22 -0.28** -0.21 -0.34*
(0.18) (0.13) (0.13) (0.18)
Stream * non-water transport -0.42*** -0.19 -0.18 -0.20
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15)
Sector (SH4) ﬁxed eﬀects X
Observations 7503 5728 5728 7503
R2 0.567 0.598
Weak id. Wald F 7.20 7.31
Underid. Chi p-value 0.02 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01
Nb. near crossings: number of border crossings at distance less than 8 km from surveyed
point. Models include controls: tariﬀs, import bans, WAEMU dummy, year ﬁxed eﬀect.
Weak id. Wald F statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic. Underidentiﬁcation
test is based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. Column 4 estimates IV-Poisson model
using a control function approach. See next table for ﬁrst stage results.
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Table 9: Table 8 continued: number of crossings equation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS IV Poisson
Nb. near crossings
Ruggedness -0.21***-0.22*** -0.18***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06)
Weight -0.23***-0.20** -0.16**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Unit value -0.35***-0.36*** -0.24***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.09)
Distance -0.13 -0.13 -0.08
(0.09) (0.09) (0.07)
Distance * pirogue -0.30 -0.23 -0.32
(0.49) (0.47) (0.37)
Distance to -1.26***-1.17*** -1.41***
oﬃcial point (0.30) (0.29) (0.28)
Multiproduct -0.27 -0.34 -0.28
(0.28) (0.25) (0.22)
Entrepôt trade -0.57 -0.80** -0.36
(0.47) (0.38) (0.45)
Petroleum products 0.41 1.04 0.42
(0.59) (1.35) (0.55)
Local products 0.07 0.44 -0.03
(0.23) (1.00) (0.20)
Bicycle/pedestrian 2.25*** 2.47*** 1.82***
(0.72) (0.73) (0.57)
Pirogues 7.68 7.10 7.72**
(5.22) (4.91) (3.93)
Motorcycles 1.08 1.15* 0.99*
(0.67) (0.64) (0.54)
Cars 1.06** 1.15*** 1.02***
(0.44) (0.41) (0.37)
Stream * non-water transport 1.20*** 1.18*** 0.89***
(0.36) (0.35) (0.33)
Residual -0.09
(0.11)
Observations 5728 5728 7503
R2 0.567 0.598
Weak id. Wald F 7.20 7.31
Underid. Chi p-value 0.02 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at market-pair level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01
Nb. near crossings: number of border crossings at distance less than 8 kilometers from
surveyed point. Wald F statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic. Underi-
dentiﬁcation test is based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. Column 4: IV-Poisson
model using control function approach. Residual reports coeﬃcient on the residual variable
included to control for endogeneity. Controls: WAEMU, tariﬀ, import ban, year.
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Table 10: Bribe payments, Poisson estimates: 2011 data only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pedestrians only
Weight 0.63*** 0.60*** 0.63*** 0.27*** 0.30*** 0.41**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.21)
Unit value 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.27*** 0.80*** 0.82*** 1.03***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.13) (0.13) (0.37)
Distance 0.12* 0.13* 0.13** -0.12** -0.14***-0.20***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Distance to 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.75*** 0.77*** 0.71***
oﬃcial post (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Multiproduct 0.28 0.20 0.27 0.31 0.35 -0.67
(0.29) (0.25) (0.27) (0.28) (0.36) (0.47)
Entrepot trade 0.08 0.09 0.29 -0.17 -0.20 -0.24
(0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.45) (0.51) (0.55)
Petroleum products 0.50 0.40 3.63*** 3.92***
(0.34) (0.32) (0.62) (0.76)
Bicycle/pedestrian -0.65* -0.53* -0.46*
(0.33) (0.31) (0.28)
Pirogues -0.97***-1.03***-1.21***
(0.36) (0.37) (0.35)
Motorcycles -1.26***-1.12***-1.17***
(0.38) (0.35) (0.35)
Cars -0.16 -0.10 -0.22
(0.28) (0.26) (0.26)
Stream x non-water transport -0.39** -0.51** -0.51***0.80** 0.70* 0.54
(0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.38) (0.40) (0.36)
Local products -0.61***-0.56*** 1.44*** 1.45***
(0.15) (0.14) (0.45) (0.45)
WAEMU -0.09 0.01 0.44 -0.45 -0.65 -0.25
(0.42) (0.42) (0.41) (0.40) (0.41) (0.46)
Tariﬀ -1.06 -0.81 1.75 8.57*** 8.20***12.54***
(1.64) (1.60) (1.79) (2.29) (2.43) (4.52)
Import ban -0.88***-0.78** -1.58***0.85*** 0.90** 1.24
(0.33) (0.32) (0.40) (0.33) (0.37) (0.76)
Male trader -0.03 0.01 -0.08 -0.50***-0.65** -0.94***
(0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.19) (0.28) (0.32)
Frequency 0.22** 0.22** 0.28 0.39*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.20) (0.21)
Wholesalers 0.36** 0.51*** -0.27 -0.59*
(0.17) (0.14) (0.40) (0.34)
Beninese 0.10 0.24 -0.17 -0.45*
(0.21) (0.18) (0.28) (0.24)
Nb. of workers 0.12* 0.08 -0.21 -0.34**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.20) (0.16)
Product (SH4) f.e. X X
Observations 4129 4129 4129 498 498 498
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by border crossing.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01
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5 Robustness checks
5.1 Sample selection and measurement error
The objective of the ECENE survey was to obtain a representative sample of informal
trade at Benin's borders. However, the nature of informal trade raises concerns in
terms of both sample selection and potential measurement errors. First, the sample
might suﬀer from selection, if traders of certain products operate at night. There is
evidence that some of the smuggling activity across the Benin-Nigeria border takes
place at night. Such trade would not be captured in the survey. If this type of trade
is quantitatively important, it could threaten the representativeness of the survey
data.
As explained in Section 2.3, a ﬁrst attempt to address these issues involves verify-
ing the consistency of the data with other sources of information on the composition
of informal trade. Products known to be important in smuggling with Nigeria ap-
pear frequently in the data and show up among the top products by trade value
recorded in the survey. This conﬁrms that no major product appears to be missing
from the data. Many of these products - such as rice, cars, and gasoline - are also the
products that face the most stringent controls on smuggling with Nigeria. The sur-
vey thus managed to measure a signiﬁcant number of these trade activities, despite
their high degree of illegality and risk. However, these qualitative assessments do
not rule out the possibility of sample selection. To further probe the inﬂuence that
such selection may have on our results, we estimate our model excluding products
with a high degree of illegality and risk.
A related concern is that of measurement error in the data. Traders' responses
to the survey may not always be truthful, which is problematic if the probability of
truthful responses varies with certain trader or cargo characteristics.
There is also evidence that some traders may pay a portion of the bribes in
advance, through arrangements made by large smugglers, meaning that bribes paid
at the time of the crossing may understate the actual bribes paid. This is a second
source of potential measurement error.
To check the robustness of our results, we ran a series of estimations of our
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models, excluding products with a high risk of measurement error.
We started by excluding all products classiﬁed as entrepôt trade. This type
of trade, involving the re-exportation of products, mostly to Nigeria, may imply a
higher level of measurement error risk than other products. High proﬁtability may
go hand-in-hand with larger-scale activities, as well as a speciﬁc organization of
operations.
Next, we tried excluding products under an import ban in Nigeria at the time of
the survey.28
Finally, we excluded the products most associated with smuggling: cars, rice,
palm oil, poultry meat, textiles, and gasoline. Some of these products, such as rice,
were not banned in 2010-2011, but were heavily smuggled into Nigeria as a result of
high trade barriers in that country. Smuggling at the Benin-Nigeria border is known
to be concentrated on these products (see e.g. Golub (2012)), and they appeared
frequently in our data. Trade of these products is likely to be high-risk, proﬁtable,
and well organized, which could imply either undermeasurement in our data or a
measurement error in the bribes reported.
Table 11 reports the results of these estimations. Most results of the baseline
Poisson model are stable when excluding either of these three groups of products.
5.2 Estimates without the distance variable
The results presented so far were obtained on the subsample of data for which the
distance variable (the distance between the goods' market of origin and the survey
point) could be computed. This excludes observations for which the origin market
could not be localized on the map. We relied primarily on these estimates, as the
distance variable is one important determinant of the amount of the bribes paid by
traders (as it measures the sum of payments made during the journey). However,
there is a risk that the selection of this subsample could aﬀect some of our results.29
To test whether our results were potentially aﬀected by this selection process,
we ran our estimations on the whole sample, excluding the distance variable from
the model. The results are presented in Tables 12, 13, 14 and 15.
Overall, the results are similar to those obtained on the selected sub-sample
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including the distance variable. Coeﬃcients on most variables are similar in mag-
nitude to those presented above. Coeﬃcients on transport mode variables are the
most aﬀected: this makes sense, as the average distance traveled by traders (and
thus the exposure to the risk of bribery) diﬀers by transport mode. The coeﬃcient
for pedestrians is thus more negative in the no-distance estimates: this coeﬃcient
captures in part the eﬀect of shorter distance for these traders.
For this reason, we view our estimates on the model including distance as more
reliable. But it is reassuring that our eﬀects of interest do not change dramatically
when using the no distance alternative. The impact of import bans, when measured
on the panel of products (Table 13), is again positive and signiﬁcant. IV estimates
also tend to conﬁrm the sign of competition eﬀects found previously: the number of
crossing points available to traders is negatively associated with the level of bribes
paid.
5.3 Negative binomial model
Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimates are consistent even if the dependent
variable does not really follow a Poisson distribution, for example if the conditional
variance exceeds the mean (overdispersion). However, the use of the negative bino-
mial model is sometimes advocated as an alternative to Poisson QMLE when there
is overdispersion. The negative binomial model entails a more general speciﬁcation
of variance, which encompasses Poisson as a special case. The Poisson QML, or
the negative binomial estimation, may be more eﬃcient, depending on the actual
functional form of the variance (see Wooldridge (2010)). An additional advantage
of the Poisson QML over the negative binomial is that the Poisson QML does not
suﬀer from the incidental parameters problem, so that ﬁxed eﬀects can be included
in the speciﬁcation without introducing a risk of bias.
As a robustness check, we ran our estimations using the negative binomial model.
We verify that these results are essentially similar to those obtained by Poisson QML
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estimation. Results are available on request.
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Table 11: Robustness check: excluding sensitive products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All No entrepôt No banned No smuggling
Weight 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.59*** 0.56*** 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.56*** 0.58***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Unit value 0.42*** 0.39*** 0.48*** 0.39*** 0.45*** 0.42*** 0.40*** 0.41***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Distance 0.23*** 0.36*** 0.22*** 0.30*** 0.21*** 0.30*** 0.12** 0.25***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07)
Distance * 0.08 -0.11 0.09 -0.08 0.07 -0.13 -0.07 0.03
pirogue (0.17) (0.20) (0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.12) (0.20)
Distance to -0.05 -0.16***-0.04 -0.14***-0.06 -0.16***0.03 -0.08
oﬃcial point (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Multiproduct -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.45*** -0.43***
(0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.11)
Entrepôt trade -0.30 -0.15 -0.07 0.08 0.39 0.42**
(0.25) (0.30) (0.24) (0.20) (0.25) (0.18)
Petroleum products 0.47** 0.54** 0.41*
(0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
Local products -0.50*** -0.29** -0.51*** -0.38***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
WAEMU -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.18 0.32 -0.45** -0.36
(0.28) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28) (0.30) (0.22) (0.25)
Tariﬀ 0.12 0.85 0.09 0.82 -0.84 2.86* -1.56 -0.54
(1.10) (1.48) (1.09) (1.16) (1.28) (1.67) (1.05) (0.96)
Import ban -0.56** -0.07 -0.29 0.48 -0.83** -0.60**
(0.25) (0.40) (0.26) (0.45) (0.33) (0.30)
Bicycle/pedestrian -0.72***-0.59***-0.70***-0.71***-0.78***-0.60***-0.60*** -0.55**
(0.25) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.28) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
Pirogues -1.55 0.96 -1.60 0.73 -1.41 1.31 0.30 -1.04
(1.84) (2.34) (2.00) (2.45) (1.99) (2.14) (1.26) (2.28)
Motorcycles -1.18***-1.07***-1.08***-1.26***-1.21***-1.06***-0.86*** -0.94***
(0.25) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.25) (0.24) (0.22) (0.27)
Cars -0.26 -0.25 -0.30* -0.36** -0.34** -0.26* -0.25 -0.21
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.18)
Stream * -0.52***-0.51 -0.60***-0.49 -0.62***-0.58* -0.26 -0.51**
non-water transport (0.15) (0.34) (0.17) (0.33) (0.17) (0.31) (0.20) (0.24)
Frequency 0.00 0.10 -0.02 0.07 -0.04 0.16** -0.05 -0.01
(0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.14) (0.10)
Beninese 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.06 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.04
(0.15) (0.12) (0.16) (0.13) (0.17) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16)
Nb. of workers 0.29*** 0.22*** 0.30*** 0.21*** 0.30*** 0.20*** 0.14* 0.10
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Wholesalers 0.41*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 0.50*** 0.43*** 0.51*** 0.23 0.32***
(0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.14) (0.09)
Year 2011 -0.27 -0.05 -0.31 0.00 -0.20 -0.00 -0.39* -0.47***
(0.19) (0.16) (0.20) (0.15) (0.19) (0.15) (0.20) (0.18)
Origin market f.e. X X X X
Sector (SH4) f.e. X X X X
Observations 7519 7519 6428 6428 6695 6695 4422 4422
Pseudo R2 0.624 0.754 0.649 0.782 0.640 0.772 0.532 0.695
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01
Poisson QML estimates. entrepôt trade is excluded in col. 3-4. All products under an import ban in Nigeria are
excluded in col. 5-6. The main products in large-scale smuggling into Nigeria - rice, palm oil, textiles, automobiles,
and poultry meat - as well as gasoline, are excluded in col. 7-8.
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Table 12: Bribe payments (Poisson QML): model without distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Weight 0.70*** 0.62*** 0.57*** 0.59*** 0.59***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Unit value 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.56*** 0.48***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Distance to 0.09 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.11*
oﬃcial post (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Multiproduct -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 -0.10 -0.08
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12)
Entrepôt trade -0.57* -0.51 -0.51 -0.26 -0.54*
(0.29) (0.31) (0.33) (0.24) (0.32)
Petroleum products 0.05 0.24 0.24
(0.19) (0.19) (0.17)
Local products -0.43***-0.42***-0.45***
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16)
WAEMU -0.07 0.04 0.02 -0.48 -0.16
(0.29) (0.28) (0.26) (0.32) (0.31)
Tariﬀ -0.92 -0.37 -0.27 -2.55***0.58
(1.09) (1.08) (0.99) (0.69) (1.43)
Import ban -0.25 -0.30 -0.33 0.64* 0.06
(0.32) (0.33) (0.37) (0.37) (0.36)
Bicycle/pedestrian -1.00***-0.97***-1.11***-1.03***
(0.20) (0.19) (0.25) (0.20)
Pirogues -0.66** -0.76***-1.79***-1.24***
(0.31) (0.29) (0.35) (0.22)
Motorcycles -1.36***-1.37***-1.37***-1.42***
(0.24) (0.24) (0.17) (0.20)
Cars -0.38** -0.36** -0.34* -0.37***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.14)
Stream * non-water transport -0.16 -0.13 -1.43***-0.87***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.24) (0.17)
Frequency -0.20 -0.23 -0.24
(0.16) (0.21) (0.23)
Beninese -0.09 -0.11 -0.08
(0.13) (0.15) (0.10)
Nb. of workers 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.27***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Wholesalers 0.18 0.06 0.20*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.12)
Year 2011 -0.31 -0.26 -0.26 -0.07 -0.07
(0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)
Origin market f.e. X X
Sector (SH4) f.e. X
Observations 12473 12389 12389 12131 12131
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by border crossing.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01
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Table 13: Bribe payments (Poisson QML), product-origin-destination ﬁxed eﬀects,
no distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Single-product only
Weight 0.72*** 0.59*** 0.72*** 0.57***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Unit value 0.63*** 0.49*** 0.58*** 0.46***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Distance to 0.05 -0.06 0.06 -0.06
oﬃcial post (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Multiproduct -0.10 -0.07
(0.16) (0.16)
Tariﬀ -50.60 -40.60 -13.15*** -11.91***
(37.99) (33.27) (3.71) (3.65)
Import ban 2.13*** 1.65*** 1.24* 1.55***
(0.71) (0.59) (0.73) (0.58)
Bicycle/pedestrian -1.06*** -1.11***
(0.19) (0.18)
Pirogues -0.73*** -0.80***
(0.26) (0.26)
Motorcycles -1.28*** -1.34***
(0.23) (0.23)
Cars -0.38*** -0.40***
(0.14) (0.13)
Stream * non-water transport -0.18 -0.18
(0.14) (0.14)
Frequency -0.29 -0.24
(0.21) (0.19)
Beninese 0.10 0.10
(0.12) (0.12)
Nb. of workers 0.30*** 0.29***
(0.06) (0.06)
Wholesalers 0.28* 0.32**
(0.15) (0.14)
Year 2011 -0.53** -0.52** -0.28 -0.31*
(0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.19)
Observations 10719 10639 12340 12256
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by border crossing.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01
Model includes ﬁxed eﬀects for product (HS-6 code), country of origin, and country of destination groups.
In columns 1 and 2, multi-product shipments are excluded.
40
Table 14: Bribes payments: number of crossings (no distance model)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poisson 2SLS IV Poisson
Nb. near crossings -0.10*** -0.02 0.01 -0.02
(0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Weight 0.61*** 0.60*** 0.61*** 0.70***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Unit value 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.60***
(0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Distance to -0.12 0.13 0.13 0.02
oﬃcial post (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16)
Multiproduct -0.15 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12
(0.14) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Entrepôt trade -0.43 -0.27** -0.23 -0.21
(0.31) (0.13) (0.14) (0.20)
Petroleum products 0.30* 0.12 0.60 0.11
(0.18) (0.11) (0.40) (0.13)
Local products -0.42*** -0.23***0.37 -0.23***
(0.15) (0.07) (0.31) (0.08)
Bicycle/pedestrian -0.86*** -0.66***-0.73*** -0.90***
(0.20) (0.17) (0.17) (0.20)
Pirogues -0.20 -0.41 -0.55 -0.66
(0.32) (0.39) (0.39) (0.56)
Motorcycles -1.25*** -0.66***-0.66*** -0.86***
(0.24) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18)
Cars -0.36** -0.25** -0.23** -0.36***
(0.16) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14)
Stream * non-water transport -0.06 -0.13 -0.16 -0.13
(0.16) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
WAEMU -0.29 -0.09 0.13 -0.30
(0.30) (0.26) (0.28) (0.34)
Tariﬀ -0.57 -1.01* 0.15 -0.35
(1.08) (0.55) (0.70) (0.79)
Import ban -0.39 -0.43***-0.35** -0.55***
(0.34) (0.13) (0.15) (0.19)
Year 2011 -0.27 -0.50***-0.50*** -0.43***
(0.18) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Observations 9538 9538 12221
R2 0.57 0.59
Weak id. Wald F 6.91 7.27
Underid. Chi p-value 0.02 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at border crossing level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01
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Table 15: Table 14, continued:number of crossings equation
(2) (3) (4)
2SLS IV Poisson
Nb. near crossings
Ruggedness -0.19***-0.19*** -0.16***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Weight -0.31***-0.33*** -0.20**
(0.09) (0.10) (0.08)
Unit value -0.32***-0.38*** -0.23**
(0.12) (0.14) (0.10)
Distance to -1.32***-1.25*** -1.43***
oﬃcial post (0.27) (0.26) (0.24)
Multiproduct -0.38 -0.47** -0.41**
(0.23) (0.22) (0.18)
Entrepôt trade -0.93** -1.22*** -0.67
(0.44) (0.46) (0.41)
Petroleum products 0.58 0.06 0.51
(0.45) (1.13) (0.41)
Local products 0.34 -0.10 0.17
(0.24) (0.85) (0.19)
Bicycle/pedestrian 1.37** 1.43** 1.20**
(0.61) (0.63) (0.49)
Pirogues 4.57*** 4.54*** 4.50***
(0.77) (0.76) (0.70)
Motorcycles 0.92 0.90 0.95*
(0.65) (0.65) (0.55)
Cars 0.52 0.53 0.59*
(0.39) (0.39) (0.35)
Stream * non-water transport 0.87** 0.84** 0.77**
(0.37) (0.38) (0.31)
WAEMU -3.17***-3.27*** -2.99***
(0.66) (0.81) (0.57)
Tariﬀ 3.76* 1.95 2.57
(2.27) (2.76) (2.01)
Import ban 0.34 0.50 0.49
(0.56) (0.47) (0.52)
Year 2011 0.11 0.14 0.12
(0.43) (0.44) (0.35)
Residual -0.03
(0.11)
Observations 9538 9538 12221
Weak id. Wald F 6.91 7.27
Underid. Chi p-value 0.02 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at border crossing level
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01
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6 Conclusion
In many developing countries, corruption is ubiquitous in the form of the small
bribes that citizens are required to pay for day-to-day access to public services and
for conducting business. These payments distort prices and may induce an ineﬃcient
allocation of resources. They may allow agents to circumvent taxes and regulations,
thus leading to private gain for the bribe taker and payer, at the expense of the
rest of society. They may also lead agents to use resources to avoid the payment of
bribes. There is, therefore, a need to better understand the mechanisms of bribery
and the reasons for its persistence.
In this paper, we focus on a region, West Africa, and a sector, cross-border trade,
where bribes are particularly common. We rely on a unique source of information
on bribe payments, an extensive survey of informal traders conducted in Benin in
2010 and 2011, which covered a wide range of cross-border transactions. We use
variation in trade regimes, transport modes, and products to identify some of the
determinants of the bribes paid by traders. Our results conﬁrm that bribes are
particularly pervasive in the trade sector: overall, about 80% of traders have paid a
bribe. This incidence remains high across trader types and products.
Traders of local products operating within the WAEMU customs union, where
most trade barriers have, in principle, been removed, face lower bribe levels. How-
ever, even these traders have to pay bribes most of the time. Our results indicate
that trade barriers and restrictions are associated with higher bribes, consistent with
collusive bribery. We also ﬁnd evidence that bribe levels are set according to traders'
elasticity of demand. Those with lighter transport modes tend to pay lower bribes.
These results are consistent with a view of bribe-taking oﬃcials as proﬁt maximizers,
who exploit market power to extract bribes from traders, and use third degree price
discrimination.
Overall, our results suggest that reductions in regional trade barriers may help
to reduce traders' exposure to bribery, but are probably not suﬃcient to eliminate
it. These measures could also help to formalize a large share of regional trade and
make regional trade more eﬃcient.
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Notes
1In 17 of the 23 years during which the Transparency International Corruption
Perception Index has been published, a Sub-Saharan African country was consid-
ered the most corrupt. The number of countries ranked was quite limited until
2007. Since then, the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index has
included around 180 countries. As a region, Sub-Saharan Africa has been considered
the most corrupt for the last six years. Source: https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi.
2These include "mineral products extracted from [member countries'] soil or de-
posited on the shore of the maritime coasts, live animals born within the community,
harvested vegetable products, ﬁshery and hunting products, products extracted from
the sea by boats registered in a member state, products from live animals that are
reared in a member state" (WAEMU treaty).
3It is possible that other trade restrictions were applied in Nigeria without being
reported to the WTO. To control for this possibility, we rely on product (SH4) ﬁxed
eﬀects in our empirical speciﬁcations.
4See https://www.customs.gov.ng/Publications/news_results.php?NewsID=
132
5Some transit trade is legal and takes place with landlocked countries for which
Cotonou is the main sea access point. This trade is conducted within the framework
of an agreement with Benin. However, most (87%) of the transit trade ﬂows in our
data go to Nigeria. The role of Benin as a trade platform is related to its geographical
situation (Golub, 2015). Cotonou has a deep water port and is located only 125 km
from Lagos.
6For example, extra-WAEMU origin imports are classiﬁed as entrepôt. Since
they enter Benin through a land border, it is very likely that they are intended to
be re-exported to Nigeria, rather than being intended for consumption in Benin.
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7Note: some crossing points are not close to a border but are located on water
streams or lakes, such as around lake Nokoue in the center of Benin's south coast.
This lake communicates with Nigeria through the lagoon river Yewa and is for this
reason a hotspot of trade with Nigeria.
8We used data on traders' characteristics to verify that at least 83% of observa-
tions related to traders observed only once in the data.
9The number of incorrect product codes is low; the within-product dispersion in
unit values is coherent. The most frequently observed products and their direction
of trade are as expected based on existing studies on informal trade in the area.
10Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang (2015) use data on payments made by truck drivers
at each roadblock, in a context close to ours. They report that most payments were
made to police and customs agents. We expect the same to be true in our case.
11The next question in the survey asked traders for the amount paid in formal
taxes, deﬁned as all payments made with a receipt. The distinction between the two
types of payment was therefore made clear in the questionnaire.
12Anecdotal evidence in Igue (1976) and World Bank (2013) suggests that, because
they can be driven on narrow bush paths, bicycles and motorbikes are used to avoid
encounters with law enforcement oﬃcers.
13See, for example, the report by the International Trade Centre (ITC, 2017)
based on a survey of ﬁrms in Benin: In principle, regulations within WAEMU
guarantee free movement of products of origin, with total exemption of customs
taxes and duties. Yet, the survey reveals that customs taxes are applied de facto
by member countries on imported products. Firms also complain about the lack
of transparency surrounding these taxes, and of the delays, cost, and complexity of
the procedure for obtaining certiﬁcates of origin.
14Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang (2015) report bribes per kilometer of between $0.03
and $0.17. In our data, bribes per (straight line) kilometer have a mean of $0.19
and a mean of $1.1 for trucks not transporting oil.
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15In about 10% of cases, it is longer than the driving route, which uses highways.
In these cases we applied the driving distance to motorcycles.
16For pirogues, we used the walking itinerary, which is usually close to the water-
way. In the empirical model, we interact the distance variable with an indicator for
pirogues, in order to better control for the speciﬁcity of measuring distance in this
case.
17The sex of traders was coded using traders' names, which are reported in the
2011 survey data. This variable is missing for about 20% of the cases because the
name is missing or uninformative (last name only).
18The distance variable also serves to control for transport costs, which may in-
ﬂuence the level of bribes.
19We counted the number of crossings at a distance less than a set threshold. The
threshold value used was twice the median of the distance to the closest point. We
then experimented with multiples of this value.
20Speciﬁcally, the variance of dependent variable yi, conditional on regressors xi,
is assumed to take the form V ar(yi|xi) = exp(βxi) + η2exp(βxi)2, where η is the
variance of an individual heterogeneity term.
21The Poisson QML estimator is more eﬃcient under the assumption that V ar(yi|xi) =
σ2exp(βxi) for some σ. See Wooldridge (2010).
22We experimented with diﬀerent levels of clustering and found that standard
errors do not change much if the clustering is at a higher level, such as the ar-
rondissement or the commune. We therefore retain the border crossing (point de
passage) in order to keep a high number of cluster groups (following e.g. Cameron
and Miller (2013)).
23The number of arrondissements in which water transport was recorded increased
from 28 in the 2010 survey to 39 in 2011 (out of a total of 84 arrondissements) due
to the fact that the ﬁrst survey was conducted in January 2010 and the second in
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September 2011, at the end of the rainy season.
24The following products were removed from the prohibition list in July 2011 (see
Nigeria's customs website, https://www.customs.gov.ng/Publications/news_results.
php?NewsID=132): raw or processed Cassava, motor vehicle seats, seats other than
garden seats or camping, equipment convertible into beds, all kinds of tooth picks,
lace fabrics and made-up garments like shirts, trousers, skirts, blouses, etc.
25We calculated the TRI using elevation data from the US geological survey
(GMTED dataset). Elevation is measured at a 30' resolution. The TRI was com-
puted as the mean square diﬀerence of altitude between each point and its eight
neighbors. We then averaged the TRI by arrondissement.
26Note, however, that the majority of small-scale traders in the context studied
in Brenton et al. (2011) are women, contrary to our data in which women are in the
minority, including among pedestrians.
27The sign of the distance variable is inverted when focusing on this sub-sample.
This could be due to the fact that the origin market as reported by traders does not
reﬂect actual the actual distance traveled by the pedestrian.
28We excluded all shipments, including some products under ban.
29We measured distance for observations where the origin market could be found
on geographic search engines, and thus, geolocalized. Smaller or less well-known
origin markets were therefore more likely to be dropped at this point.
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